Jardine Strategic – Are you a value investor? Really?
Nov 2019 ($32)
What if we could offer you a share which trades at 0.56x the NAV, and that NAV grows and the NAV was also super prudently priced – a double discount as it were. Would that interest you?
- Regular readers will know of our longstanding work on investment holding company Exor which has aged well. Today we present another family-run investment holding company which has much similarity to Exor. It looks to us to offer significant value, just as Exor did in 2013 and 2015, for those prepared to do the work.
- Now, whilst we like the Margin of Safety such shares can offer vs. their Sum of Parts, we also realise the folly of expecting longstanding discounts to NAV to suddenly disappear just because you own the shares! So, what we seek in investment holding company ideas is for them to ideally have a combination of businesses that are high-quality growing compounders and then also a low price vs. a prudent valuation (in Exor’s case in 2015, this was the case with Fiat, Ferrari, CNH et al).
- The business we highlight today is Jardine Strategic. A longstanding investment holding company under the tutelage of the Keswick family for five generations.
- Caveat out of the way first: this is an esoteric company and stock. It is a British company incorporated in Bermuda, listed in Singapore but headquartered in Hong Kong. This messiness precludes the stock’s inclusion in many MSCI indices. It also has an opaque corporate structure with cross ownership in its sister company Jardine Matheson which means that its effective share count is actually half the headline figure. Getting this latter point right is key to understanding the value on offer.
- That out of the way, this is above-all a very prudently run conglomerate with minimal debt (at all levels) and – importantly – a portfolio of rare assets and businesses which are publicly listed. Whilst the parent sits at an attractive discount to an easy to calculate Sum of Parts (NAV), we think several of these individual holdings are in turn very prudently valued versus their asset backing and earnings power also.
- Simplistically, purchasers of Jardine Strategic shares today get exposure to Hong Kong super prime real estate (valued at 0.33x tangible book), an exceptional south-east Asian food retailer (whose returns are reminiscent of Tesco in its heyday), Mandarin Oriental (also at c.0.3x it Property value) and finally a top-notch Indonesian industrials business (valued at c.12x PE). But you have upside of c.63% to get to these valuations!
- We confess that (newly promoted to Chairman) Ben Keswick, is to us, something of an unknown quantity compared to say John Elkann. Ben Keswick has maintained a far lower profile than the aforementioned Elkann (who himself is hardly a headline grabber), and this limits our ability to assess his future stewardship of the assets to the same degree. That said, the combination of the value on offer and a strong historical financial track record offsets this risk to a considerable degree.
How far will you go for value?
With a largely ‘developed markets’ list of clients there is a chance that few of our readers will spend sufficient time on an idea such as this. Indeed for us, as an exercise in Equity Research return on capital (i.e. time) this will not be our most profitable idea. That said, we feel it is still a large part of our role to get our clients to look in different places in the search for value and superior longer term returns, particularly when so many predictable companies are priced for perfection these days.
In fact, this is the second time we have completed this exercise, having looked closely at the Jardine conglomerate and its large discount in 2015, but we never published our work. The discount duly narrowed and the shares rose from $27 to c.$44. Weaker Asian markets and protests in Hong Kong have brought the shares down once again. This time to record high discount. We suspect that readers of this piece will either be very interested or not at all. We thus explain our thesis by way of a number of charts and models we have built to better understand the underlying companies. The crucial ones are our, and Jardine’s own, illustration of the Sum of Parts work laid out in Figures 3 and 4. These show our calculation of the company’s intrinsic value and that calculated by the company. However, before looking at these investors must accept that there is complexity in the holding structure of the parent companies, i.e., Jardine Matheson and Strategic. This leads to two important outcomes. Firstly, that the number of shares in issue for Jardine Strategic must be altered to reflect this cross holding. The second being that there are two possible ways to calculate value as a result.
Fig.1 Jardine Group structure
Source: Holland Advisors
Fig.2 The company helpfully clarifies the ‘correct’ share count to use!
Source: Jardine Strategic 2018 Annual Report
Sum of Parts – as Mr Market sees it
Sometimes value can be hidden in plain sight. Indeed, Exor has laid out its Sum of Parts or NAV for all investors to see for many years; Fig.3 below shows that Jardine do exactly the same. Whether we choose to take any notice however is up to us. Seemingly few in Asia do, for this is seen as a sleepy conglomerate that pays few dividends, is neither an exciting investment as nothing ever changes, nor is presumed to have a foreseeable catalyst to release any of the value it demonstrates. Just to be upfront, we agree with each of these points but we also think that sometimes when the value on offer is egregious enough, catalysts are not needed, especially if the underlying entity is growing and well managed.
Below is the Jardine look through NAV per share that it discloses to investors every 6 months. Importantly all the figures in this table below are taken from the quoted share prices of each of the respective companies i.e. all Jardine are doing is showing a portfolio of shares that they own significant stakes in and what the total adds up to. We as investors are then able to look at this vs. the market price of Jardine shares, $32 at last trade.
Clearly market prices change and our valuation work shown on page 4 lays out this valuation in a little more detail. It also updates Jardine’s value for current prices. The outcome is a figure lower than the end June NAV of $61. Using two different approaches, due to the holding company structure, we end up with a range of $51-$53. Hopefully readers will note this is still some way higher than $32. However, this is still only part of the story.
Double discounts make things a little more interesting
What is not visible in these calculations is the value we think is also on offer in the underling companies themselves. This is where a far greater amount of work is required but also where we think the real edge lies that investors can have in these shares. Some of these insights are intangible and some more obvious. We tackle them in no particular order
Fig.3 Jardine Sum of Parts
Source: Jardine Strategic (June 2019 Interims)
Fig.4 Holland Advisors Jardine Strategic valuation

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Double discounts continued
We will start this section by observing that the upside to the current SOTP using the current quoted price we have shown on the previous page is 63%, i.e. that would be the return to shareholders owning a stock today at $32 that tomorrow changed hands for $51. The following sub-company observations we will add to this to give context to this discount.
We will start with Hong Kong Land
The chart below shows the tangible book value per share for Hong Kong Land. Overlaid on top is the Price/Tangible book. It can be seen that while the company has once traded at its book value, mostly it has traded at a discount. However, today’s discount is extremely high particularly when we look at the assets owned and the leverage (or lack of it).
Hong Kong Land assets are high quality commercial, residential and retail assets in super prime Hong Kong locations. Indeed, it is said that c.75% of all prime Hong Kong real estate is held either by Li Ka-shing or Hong Kong Land Company Ltd. Those looking at the companies accounts in more detail will also find the following:
- That the assets are valued using discount rates of between 3-4.5%
- That despite being a prime location property company the company is net cash!
- That these assets have been owned almost forever
Fig.5: Hong Kong Land
Source: Bloomberg
Accepting our own limitations as property valuers and Hong Kong political experts were we to assume that Hong Kong Land is worth only 0.5x TNAV per share, this would add $7bn to its valuation and $3.5bn to the Jardine pro-rata stake in it.*
(*NB: We will say straight-up that find ourselves uncomfortable in this company as we just cannot believe that the price vs value we are seeing is correct. If you know something we do not please feel free to get in touch and put us straight!)
Mandarin Oriental
Whilst representing only 5% of the Jardine Sum of Parts it is an interesting company when you have a look at its accounts. Whilst Mr Market values it at a function of its earnings power (16x EV/EBITDA), not an unreasonable approach, there are other possible avenues of value that should be considered. In a global sector that has seen many companies move from an asset heavy to asset light, Mandarin Oriental (MO) is a stand out. As we write, its market cap is $2bn. However, as the freehold property owner of 16 of its 32 hotels, it has an adjusted NAV of $5.8bn. The debt burden it carries against this massive asset backing?…$284m!
Were we to value this company at say 60% of its revalued property NAV that would add $1.5bn to its market cap and a pro-rata $1.2bn to Jardine’s 78% stake in it.
Dairy Farm and Jardine Cycle
Combined, these two companies represent 45% of the Jardine valuation we have shown earlier in Fig.4. In truth, what we should really be looking at is Dairy Farm and Astra as Astra makes up the vast majority of Jardine Cycle’s valuation (a quick look at Fig.1 might be in order here to remind you of the ownership maze!). Yet again, both of these companies are separately listed and thus their quoted valuations are used in the Sum of Parts. What is interesting to us is what we have learnt from looking at them using the lens of our ‘Franchise’ approach. Our summary models for each companies’ financial history is shown in the Appendix of this report. We know our comments on each will be superficial in comparison to detailed local analysts, however we think our approach shows:
- Both companies have had excellent past financial economics (see Appendix for summary financials) making impressive returns on capital and successfully reinvesting those returns for future organic growth.
- Dairy Farm (a c.28% ROE retailer with limited debt) has historically been valued at what we would consider a higher price, but we think that was partly a function of its impressive growth and the fact this its cash generative model resulted in good dividends. Todays its PE at 18x is much lower than it’s past, but still does not necessarily suggest an egregious mispricing to us. We note its 4% dividend yield due to a cash generative business model, which likely supports its valuation.
- Astra is also interesting – again due to the strong return on capital it has made over long periods, but also the good nominal growth it has achieved (9% revenue cagr growth for 10+years). Indeed, when looking at Jardine in 2015 we noticed the strength of the Astra business at that time. Astra today, post a recent share piece fall, trades on PE of 12x earnings. Whilst we can see that this valuation is in some way reflective of its exposure to heavy industry machinery, we think it likely undervalues its market position in motorcycles and the overall strength in the compounding ability of the business.
- In short, we are prepared to label both of these business as solid compounders and think it likely were capital being reinvested in them it would grow at rate of between 5-10% over most investment timeframes. This conclusion is neither precise nor perhaps that insightful in and of itself. However, when assessing Jardine as a parent we feel we need to be approximately right vs. exactly wrong. We also need to know what type of assets we are investing in.
Keswick’s – aligned owner managers?
In this piece we have not written at all about the owner managers we are investing alongside – normally a vital piece of the jigsaw for us. We could spend a great deal of time extracting facts from Wikipedia or other sources on the long history of this family but we feel that adds little.
Our research into them has led to both examples of astute counter cyclical purchases made by the company such as buying the stake in Astra during the depth of the Asian crisis in 1998. Equally it has also thrown up the odd example of poorer capital allocation in much earlier decades. Few of these examples are recent enough we feel to be useful and finding interviews that provide any management insight is very hard indeed. We do however know that members of the Keswick family move around in head positions at the different subsidiary companies. As such their long-term compounding record reflects well on the ability of the family to instigate organic growth from re-investment at least as a backward-looking measure. Additionally, we also note the recent sale of the Jardine Lloyd Thompson and the occasional Mandarin Oriental hotel freehold that is put up for sale.
In comparison to Exor we know very little about this family and their abilities or ambitions yet. We can perhaps conclude at this stage is that:
- They have very very long time scales,
- They tend to be buy and hold businesspeople
- They have an abject dislike of leverage.
As a combination those traits are good starting points. Importantly we have not found evidence of any abuse of minority investors, which we think is an important checklist item in such opportunities. We would love to know more and spend time with Ben Keswick in particular.

Source: Jardine Strategic Annual Report
Why?
Whilst working on this idea a recurring thought came to us. Why does this opportunity exist? We have decided that it is in part a function of the complexity of the organisation and that this does not sit well with Asian investors who are more interested in faster growth stories. Additionally, we feel this company is not covered well by analysts (only two cover it) and dismissed by many with any under valuation seemingly always being elusive.
We would also make one further point which follows on from our strategy piece we published in the summer (Mr Market’s broken machine). This company is likely a mainstay investment of the Asian/global value brigade, not least due to the points we mention above, but also due to its large size. We also know that value investors worldwide are having funds taken away from them for re-investment in “strategies that work” – as investors and consultants see it. As such they have to sell something… Who is the marginally buyer of these sold shares? Frankly, we cannot find one. Therein lies the opportunity Mr Market presents us with today.
Conclusion and likely upside
In two out of the four assets Jardine owns we feel today’s market prices underestimate their intrinsic value by enough of a margin for us to think that adjusting them somewhat makes sense even when trying to take a prudent approach. As a result, combining our thoughts on Hong Kong Land and Mandarin Oriental would add $4.7bn to our best guess prudent NAV of the Jardine group. Perhaps more importantly all four companies we have looked at control either rare assets, brands or have market power/evidence of great compounded returns. As we have said at the outset of this piece this is a critical point when looking at the possibility of buying a position in an undervalued conglomerate. Is the entity both prudently valued and likely to compound at a good rate? Post our work we can answer ‘yes’ to both.
Adding our adjustments to the value of stakes in Mandarin Oriental and Hong Kong Land Limited to the Sum of Parts given in Fig.4 suggests a more representative, but still prudent, value per share for Jardine Strategic of $60 ($4.7bn uplift on c.$30bn NAV) vs. the previous range of $51-$53. Verses a share price today of $32 that suggests an upside of 87% just to get to fair value for the assets today. As for how such value is realised, or indeed how long it will take, we do not know, but in world of rare assets changing hands at even rarefied prices and where there is leverage aplenty, we find solace in such Margins of Safety. Maybe the right price for all this complexity and lack of control is a 25% discount to an adjusted NAV. That would be as good an investor target price as any other. It would still imply 49% upside.
Buy Jardine Strategic
Andrew Hollingworth & Mark Power
The Directors and employees of Holland Advisors may have a beneficial interest in some of the companies mentioned in this report via holdings in a fund that they also act as advisors to.
Appendix
ASTRA FINANCIALS

DAIRY FARM FINANCIALS
![PROFITS Sales adj EBIT adj EBIT margin EBITA EBITDA Effective P&L Tax Rate Net Income Cash Earnings = [Cash from ops]-Capex Share in issue EPS ASSETS Total Fixed Assets Working Capital Net Tangible Assets Taxed RoNTA Asset Tums Total Assets Shareholder Equity Pension Liability Cash ROE LIABILITIES Net Debt Net Debt/EBIT 10 year cagr *DIV/O! 10 year cagr 8% 10 year cagr FY08 6,733 0 374 506 333 308 1,348 0.00 FY08 637 0 637 48% 10.6x 2,507 334 27.0 FY08 25 #DIV/O! FY09 7,029 428 6% 427 567 17% 364 219 1,349 0.00 FY09 733 (756) (23) 115% -305.6x 2,806 528 31.1 FY09 (34) -.1x FYIO 7,971 469 6% 475 637 17% 411 1,351 0.00 FYIO 921 (893) 28 17167% 288.8x 3,258 734 33.9 74% FYIO (223) -.5x FYII 9,134 534 6% 541 716 17% 484 517 1,352 0.00 FYII 896 (973) (77) -1807% -118.2x 3,539 930 36.1 62% FYII (466) FY12 9,801 483 486 669 16% 447 408 1,353 0.00 FY12 1,070 (534) 536 179% 18.3x 3,851 1,239 40.2 FY12 (521) -1.1x FY13 10,357 527 559 745 17% 501 387 1,353 0.00 FY13 1,082 (368) 714 14.5x 3,964 1,377 24.0 30% FY13 (638) -1.2x FY14 11,008 528 542 735 16% 509 379 1,353 0.37 FY14 1,219 (494) 725 15.2x 4,316 1,523 37.7 26% FY14 (475) FY15 11,137 440 4% 443 642 17% 424 438 1,352 0.32 FY15 1,141 (530) 611 18.2x 4,821 1,455 71.4 29% FY15 482 1.1x FY16 11,201 468 4% 475 671 469 330 1,353 0.34 FY16 1,100 (426) 673 63% 16.6x 5,129 1,579 52.4 22% FY16 641 1.4x FYI 7 11,289 376 3% 386 585 19% 402 453 1,353 0.30 FYI 7 1,184 (465) 719 15.7x 5,467 1,756 34.2 27% FYI 7 602 1.6x FY18 11,749 413 4% 100 305 92 421 1,353 0.31 FY18 848 (495) 353 8% 33.3x 5,390 1,491 47.6 26% FY18 744 1.8x](https://hollandadvisors.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/profits-sales-adj-ebit-adj-ebit-margin-ebita-1.png)
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