Reflections on a Mental Model: ‘Scale Economics Shared’ – Jeff Bezos’ next job: Head of Holland Marketing!
Apr 2021
Many of you, we are sure, will have read Jeff Bezos latest Amazon shareholder letter[1]. We attach a few extracts from it below that those reading our own research might find interesting. Any of you that read our recent piece on JD Wetherspoon, we hope will notice very strong similarities in both Bezos’ and our attempts to quantify a business moat! Neither of us were original but whilst we called-out the source of inspiration (Buffett’s 2005 shareholder letter), Mr. Bezos did not. However, that Bezos chose to share this analysis and insight as he steps down as CEO of Amazon we think is very telling. Taking a step back to calculate the scale of benefits that have accrued to all different stakeholders in business is a very powerful way to demonstrate its moat we think. What Bezos is employing is a very powerful mental model that we ourselves have used extensively for a long time.
“I want to invest in companies that are a win–win for their entire ecosystem” – Buffett
Just a little reflection on so-called mental models
Much as we have made the following observations to some clients verbally, inside research pieces or on Twitter, we would like to be upfront on what could be described as a little ‘style drift’ at Holland Advisors (but in a good way we hope). As we now have worked our way through the analysis of thousands of companies over decades, we have developed many mental models along the way (Thank you, Mr Munger). As such, we know to look for Brands, Toll Road, Tipping Points and many more attributes that can create future value for investors.
We have also for many years used Buffett’s great shortlist of Dream, Compounders and Gruesome[2] businesses to understand the types of companies we seek and just as importantly those we wish to avoid. That ‘Dream’ businesses (high ROIC + growing) are often statistically the best to seek out we of course can agree with. However, experience has taught us something that the modelling of these businesses does not show. This being that ‘others’ tend to find those companies too and thus they might not be mispriced in equity markets for long. Additionally, that cohort of ‘others’ can include new competitors. That Gillette was a high ROIC, low capital employed, growing business (i.e. a classic Dream model) was likely not lost on the founders of Dollar Shave Club and Harry’s. In short, great branded companies are rarely mispriced.
The road less travelled – ‘Scale Economics Shared (SES)’
What we have noticed along the way is that the shares of some great businesses price-in future growth somewhat efficiently. Efficient markets like the obvious, but that is not always the case in SES businesses. A simple contrast between the average branded company and the average EDLP company might be instructive.
We will not go into EDLP model specifics here, but just say that we think brands and their high ROIC’s are relatively easy for investors to understand and identify. By contrast, companies that chose to invest in say, pricing and infrastructure over long periods to build long-term customer trust and thus future demand can find such a strategy to be costly in terms of short-term profits and thus investor support. In high growth sectors, such as Tech there is a recent seemingly endless belief that blindly building such scale is a good thing. However, we think there are lots of other areas of the economy and investing where the same strategy is employed, but investors often fail to see the moat that is being built or widened.
One might put it this way: the well-worn phrase ‘economies of scale’ is something every lay person understands in life and many companies pursue scale for the obvious benefits. The great companies however go a step further than just seeking scale. As Bezos puts it below, they create more than they consume. Which leads us to the phrase (a Mental Model) ‘Scale Economics Shared’. This is not just an attempt to bamboozle with jargon but is actually a really subtle way of describing a phenomenally powerful business strategy.
As the investor who coined the term, wrote:
“Most companies pursue scale efficiencies, but few share them.”
Hopefully those that will have read our many years of work on JDW/Ryanair/Schwab/Greggs et al will have seen good evidence of this in our own thinking at Holland in recent years. So, you might say, what’s new?
What is new is our increased conviction in this area and as a result the greater amount of time we want to spend seeking out these businesses.
For that we will call out and thank Messrs Nick Sleep and Qais Zakaria who ran the successful Nomad Investment Partnership and coined the above phrase. We have never met either gentlemen, but reading their letters at Christmas was, for us, like looking in a rose-tinted mirror. Rose-tinted of course because they achieved not only great investment performance, but just as importantly they articulated perfectly, the business models of Costco and Amazon presciently many many years before those businesses saw the full fruits of their labour that is today on full display.
Those letters did not change our thinking per se but they clarified it in two ways.
- Firstly, we credit the Nomad men for coining the great phrase ‘Scale Economics Shared’ in their beautifully crafted letters. In truth we think the phrase is better than Jim Collins’ ‘Flywheel’ or Walmart’s EDLP language that we had adopted. Nomad’s phrase far better encapsulates what the best EDLP companies do… they share the benefits of their scale.
We might add that it this very sharing of scale is what can make the companies hard for investors to identify early-on/understand which offers opportunity to those that can.
“People who think well, write well” – David Ogilvy (the original “Mad Man”)
- Of far greater benefit to us personally however was the conviction and clarity reading these letters gave us in our own approach. As far back as 2012 we had identified Ryanair’s and JDW’s superb lowest-cost models but getting the right language to describe the true value of the model is extremely helpful in solidifying our thinking. Additionally, our EDLP views have been far from universally well received in the past.
As purveyors of our own investment research, we get lots of questions and feedback from other great investors. We are genuinely lucky and proud to have such talented investors as clients and have learnt a great deal from them. However, the danger perhaps in this is that we are encouraged to look for too many different types of value in too many places of the market. Indeed c.10 years ago we were proud to say that we did just that (i.e. we then sought-out ‘deep value’, ‘work-outs’, ‘franchises’ etc…).
There is of course nothing wrong with such a broad approach but there is a point when you have to establish what you are best at/where your niche is. Ours, we think, has always been as contrarian value buyers. More specifically, it lies with buying owner-managed businesses that have shown past compounding potential but today for some reason are priced to fail/no longer compound. But could we focus-in a little more?
Although the publication of Nomad’s letters has developed a cult following in the last few months, we can honestly and proudly say our style drift was well under way before their publication. Never-the-less we thank the authors for helping solidify our thinking.
You either ‘get’ deferred gratification or you don’t.
“Waiting helps you as an investor and a lot of people just can’t stand to wait,” Munger once said. “If you didn’t get the deferred-gratification gene, you’ve got to work very hard to overcome that.” – Charlie Munger
We have almost always found value in EDLP businesses as rarely do we observe are they all priced for success (some are, some are not). In addition, we have almost always been surprised with the strength and reliance of their future growth (i.e. lack of ‘fade’ rate). This being a by-product of the unrecognised customer trust that today’s low prices and great service builds over time. Investor reluctance we think comes from the difficulty in understanding the outsized reward of deferred gratification, low margins or long required investment cycles. Importantly it also comes we think from industry and sector-specific framing. By that we mean there might be only one true EDLP/’Scale Economics Shared’ company in that region or sector thus making the understanding of the company hard both for local analysts and global franchise investors alike. JD Wetherspoons and AirAsia we think are both excellent examples of this.
Investors noting Amazon or Costco as examples of this model should note that they have become in some ways exceptions to our rule, i.e. they are now widely recognised for the scale and power of business model that they have built. We admire them both greatly, and realise that as early proponents of the power of this business model, that not buying Amazon shares was a huge error of omission on our part. However, at today’s starting prices we can now often find better value in similar but less well understood SES companies elsewhere in the world.
Our experience has shown us how powerful these scale economics shared models are. It has also shown us that for some extended periods they can be mispriced. That is an opportunity we should not pass by. Recent pieces have already seen us spend more time in their area (JDW/AirAsia/Schwab). Followers of our work should expect more of the same.
Fig.1 below shows the excerpt from Bezos’ letter where he articulates how Amazon ‘shares the spoils’ of its scale with each constituent stakeholders.
Fig.2 is a reminder that we had done this exact same analysis ourselves when assessing JD Weatherspoon’s moat earlier this year.
Fig.1a: Amazon 2020 letter extract 1
Fig.1b: Amazon 2020 letter extract 2
Source: Jeff Bezos, Amazon CEO 2020 letter to Shareholders
Fig.2: An assessment of JDW’s moat. Great minds think alike?
Source: Holland Advisors JDW, Walton on Thames, March 2021 Pg10
NB. The Nomad letters were distributed online without their authors permission or knowledge. Graciously however they have put an edited copy onto their own foundation’s website. We encourage those interested to only look at this link and also read the touching preamble and post-amble that accompanies them. #ClassPersonified.
Andrew Hollingworth & Mark Power
Directors and employees of Holland Advisors may have a beneficial interest in some of the companies mentioned in this report via holdings in a fund that they also act as managers to.
Disclaimer
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- https://s2.q4cdn.com/299287126/files/doc_financials/2021/ar/Amazon-2020-Shareholder-Letter-and-1997-Shareholder-Letter.pdf ↑
- See Berkshire Hathaway 2007+ 2007 annual letters ↑